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NOTE
Castano v. American Tobacco Company: America's Nicotine
Plaintiffs Have No Class
Judge Jones in Louisiana would be creating a Frankenstein's
monster ifhe should allow certification of whatpurports to be a class
action on behalfof everyone who has ever been addictedto nicotine.I
Professor Charles Alan Wright
I. INTRODUCTION

In Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 2 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
was confronted with "[possibly] the largest class action ever attempted in federal
court," a class action on behalf of, generally, all persons in the United States who
had ever been addicted to nicotine.' Although the district court judge's decision
was in favor of certification, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, fearing the
prospect of a "Frankenstein's monster,"4 ultimately decertified the class.'
The scope of this note leaves the issue of nicotine addiction to the scientific
experts. It examines the prior jurisprudence and Castano'sclass action analysis
as indicators of whether the federal courts can, or should, certify immature,
complex, mass torts as nationwide class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The note also discusses whether the federal courts
should formulate a federal common law of torts in the mass accident context, or
in the alternative, devise federal common law choice-of-law rules to apply to
such class actions.
II.

FACTS OF THE CASTANO CASE

In March 1993, a prospective class of plaintiffs, represented by countless
attorneys from across the country, descended on New Orleans, Louisiana.' The
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I. Letter from Professor Charles Alan Wright, University of Texas School of Law, to N. Reid
Neureiter, Williams &Connolly, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 22, 1994) in Castano v.American Tobacco
Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.19 (5th Cir. 1996).
2. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
3. Id. at 737.
4. In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, opponents of the class action device characterized it
as "legalized blackmail" and a "Frankenstein's Monster." The term was first used in Chief Judge
Lumbard's dissent in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968), to apply to
the specific case, but was subsequently applied to all class actions. Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein
Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem. " 92 Harv. L. Rev.
664, 665 n.9 (1979).
5. Castano, 84 F.3d at 737.
6. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 547 (E.D. La. 1995).
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would-be class consisted of all "nicotine-dependent" ' persons in the United
States, including current, former and deceased smokers and their heirs.' They
alleged ten causes of action in tort and products liability against cigarette
manufacturers, seeking compensation solely for the injury of nicotine addiction.9
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 1) failed to inform consumers that
nicotine is addictive, and 2) manipulated levels ofnicotine in cigarettes to sustain
addictivity.' °
The district court conditionally certified the class, under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, on several "core" issues, dealing primarily with
the liability of the cigarette manufacturers." The district court contemplated
that a multitude of separate adjudications on individual issues would follow a
single jury's resolution of the "core" issues. 2
The case was heard on appeal by Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Judges Jerry E. Smith, John M. Duhe, Jr., and Harold R. DeMoss, Jr.
Writing for the unanimous panel, Judge Smith called for decertification of
the class. Held: Certification of the class did not meet the standards of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the commonality/predominance and superiority requirements, because 1) the district court
failed to consider how variations in state law would affect litigants, 2) the
district court failed to inquire as to how the subsequent individual trials would
be litigated, and 3) the class independently failed Rule 23's superiority
requirement because of the disadvantages of litigating the action as a class action
suit.

7. Castano, 84 F.3d at 737.
8. Id. at 738. More precisely, the class was made up of all nicotine-dependent persons in the
United States who had purchased and smoked cigarettes manufactured by the defendants. The class
also consisted of the estates and representatives of these nicotine-dependent persons, as well as their
spouses, children, relatives, and "significant others" as their heirs and survivors. Persons with claims
before 1943 were not included in the class.
9. Id. The causes of action included: I) fraud and deceit, 2) negligent misrepresentation,
3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, 4) negligence, 5) negligent infliction of emotional
distress, 6) violation of state consumer protection statutes, 7)breach of express warranty, 8)breach
of implied warranty, and 9) Louisiana redhibition. The plaintiffs limited their claims to those since
1943.
10. Id. at 739.
It. Id. The issues of"core liability" were to include particular common issues of both fact and
law. Common issues of fact would include whether particular defendants knew smoking was
addictive, failed to inform cigarette smokers of such, and took actions to addict cigarette smokers.
Common legal issues would include fraud, negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, and
violation of consumer protection statutes. In addition, the jury would determine the defendants'
liability for punitive damages.
12. Id.at 740. The district court denied certification of the class on the issues of injury-in-fact,
proximate cause, reliance, affirmative defenses, and compensatory damages because of each issue's
individual nature. The district court contemplated these issues would be. litigated if and when the
"core issues" had been resolved in favor of the plaintiff class.

1998]

NOTE
Il.

PRIOR LAW

A. Generally
The class action device has been the most controversial recent development
in the law of federal procedure. 3 The class action was originally an instrument
of equity which provided large groups of interested parties a procedural device
by which they could, as plaintiffs, properly enforce their equitable rights, or as
defendants, properly protect such rights." Congress first recognized the class
action device when it adopted Rule 23 in 1938.' s Despite an attempt in 1966
to make the requirements more functional, the procedure remains "extremely
complicated." 6
The Advisory Committee for these 1966 amendments noted that a "mass
accident," or one which results in injuries to numerous persons, is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action.' 7 The Committee determined that a mass
accident greatly increases the likelihood of significant individual questions of
damages, liability, and defenses." As a result, the Committee feared that such9
class actions would usually break down into separate, individual lawsuits.'
Nevertheless, there is no statutory provision directly prohibiting class certification
of such actions."
B. Rule 23 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure details the procedure for
maintaining a suit as a class action in federal court. 2' The four prerequisites to
a class action under Rule 23(a) are numerosity, adequacy, typicality and
commonality.2 First, a class must be so numerous as to make it impractical for
the controversy to be litigated individually." Second, the named members must
adequately represent the interests of the entire class. 2' Next, the named
plaintiffs of the class are required to have incentives aligned with, or those

13.
14.

Charles A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 872 (5th ed. 1994).
Id. (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948)).

15. Id.
Id.
17. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P.23(bX3), Advisory Notes to 1966 Amendment).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Fed. R. Civ. P.23.
22. Id.
23. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 550 (E.D. La. 1995).
24. Id.at 551.
16.
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typical of, the absent members of the class. 25 Finally, there must be questions
of law or fact common to the class.26
Rule 23(b) further mandates, among other things, that the district court find
predominance (which is akin to commonality) and superiority. 7 The questions
of law or fact common to the members must predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members." Additionally, the class action method
must be shown to be superior to other methods available for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.29 The Castanoopinion primarily addresses the
issues of commonality/predominance and superiority.
1. Commonality and Predominance
Rule 23(a)(2) requires there to be "questions of law or fact common to the
class."30 Rule 23(b)(3) incorporates this "commonality," requiring the court to
find that such questions "predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members."'" This assures that the action can be realistically and
effectively maintained and that the interests of absent members will be fairly and
adequately represented. 2
The courts usually apply a low threshold for commonality; it is often
satisfied when the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with
the prospective class." However, courts set a higher standard for commonality
when the potential class involves issues of personal injury damages. This
standard is necessary to confront the individualized issues of liability and the
extent of damages of such mass torts. 4 The higher standard is also required in
the context of complex torts, such as products liability actions, in which no one
set of facts establishes liability, and the defendants can raise different affirmative
defenses against each plaintiff."
The federal courts have certified classes involving complex mass torts, but
those cases usually centered around the resolution of a single, determinative
issue.3 6 For example, in In re "Agent Orange" ProductsLiability Litigation,7
class certification was justified because ofthe emphasis on the military contractor

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 550-51.
Id. at 550.
Fed. ILCiv. P. 23(b).
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 632.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(aX2).
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626.
Id. at 630.

33.

Id. at 627.

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 628.
37. 818 F.2d 145, 167 (2d Cir. 1987).
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defense, which, if successful, would terminate the entire litigation. 8 However,
the court in In re FibreboardCorp.," refused to certify a class of 2,990
members in an asbestos-related suit because of the many disparities among the
individual plaintiffs, such as different diseases, various amounts ofexposure, and
materially different lifestyles.4 '
In In re School Asbestos Litigation ("School Asbestos"),4" the court
affirmed a class certification concerning property damage associated with
asbestos removal from the nation's schools, despite the inherent variations in
state law.4" In that case, counselors for the class conducted an extensive
analysis of the products liability law in each jurisdiction, determining that the
applicable law of the states could be broken into four manageable patterns.43
As a result, the court determined that the variations of state law were manageable, and therefore Rule 23's commonality/predominance requirement could still
be met."
However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc. 5 found that the huge number of important individual issues
overwhelmed any common questions of law and fact.46 For example, each
member was exposed to a different asbestos-containing product, for different
amounts of time, and in different ways. 7 Each member had differing degrees
of physical injury, complicating the damages inquiry, as well as a different
history of cigarette smoking, complicating the inquiry into causation.4 Finally,
the court would be dealing with fifty state law variations, including choice-of-law
rules, statutes of limitations, and comparative/contributory negligence provisions."'

38. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 628.
39. 893 F.2d 706 (Sth Cir. 1990).
40. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 628-29 (discussing In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d at 712).
41. 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 107 S.Ct. 182 and 479 U.S. 915, 107
S. Ct. 318 (1986).
42. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 627.
43. Id. at 627 n.13. See also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 915, 107 S.Ct. 3188 (1987) (determining that after an "extensive analysis" of state
law variances, that class certification did not "present insuperable obstacles").
44. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 627.
45. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
46. Id. The Third Circuit confronted this massive class action suit concerning asbestos
exposure just two weeks before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the Castano opinion. The
representatives of both sides of the asbestos controversy had reached a settlement which covered not
only "injured" plaintiffs, who alleged to have physical injuries caused by asbestos exposure, but
"exposure-only" plaintiffs as well, who feared that they might contract some asbestos-related disease
in the future. The court analyzed the case as if the suit were going to be litigated (and not settled),
and determined that the class did not meet, among other requirements, the commonality/predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23. Id. at 619.
47. Id. at 626.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 627
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The Georgine court distinguished itself from School Asbestos by noting
the latter case involved far fewer individualized questions of law and fact
because it concerned property damage suits, and not the more complicated
personal injury suits.50 Furthermore, the personal injury law in Georginecould
not be broken down into as few a number of patterns as could the law in School
Asbestos."
2. Superiority
Rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to find that a class action is "superior to
other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of the particular
controversy."" In Georgine,the court determined that the suit failed both the
efficiency and the fairness prongs of the superiority analysis.
The court found that the class action format would be inefficient for two
reasons." First, the class action would be overwhelming because of the many
uncommon, individual issues discussed earlier.'
Second, the tremendous
number of potential class members was staggering. As a result, the court
concluded the suit could be better litigated on a case-by-case basis."
Concerning fairness, the Georginecourt determined that the stakes for each
plaintiff were simply too high to be decided in a class action case." The class
action is certainly a proper vehicle for suit when the potential gains of the
plaintiff are outweighed by the costs of an individual adjudication." However,
Georgine involved personal injury and death claims with potentially huge
rewards in the tort system."8 Therefore, the court determined, out of fairness,
that the plaintiffs should not be denied the decision on whether and when to
settle out of court.5 9
The court also found inherent unfairness in the inadequacy of notification to
potential plaintiffs." The court anticipated that many potential plaintiffs would
not be adequately notified of the terms at stake. 6" The "exposure-only"
plaintiffs would be especially difficult to notify and inform, because many either

50.

Id.

51. Id. n.13.
52. Fed. R.Civ. P.23(bX3).
53. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 632.
54. Id. See supra Section 111.1.1 for a discussion ofthe individual issues in the context of the
commonality and predominance requirement.
55. Georglne, 83 F.3d at 632.
56. Id. at 633.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 633.
61. Id.
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did not know, did not remember, or did not care that they had previously been
exposed to asbestos.6"
Nevertheless, certain asbestos-related class action suits, in addition to School
Asbestos, have been certified. For example, in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries,"
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that considerable expense could be
saved, both for the litigants and the court, by resolving certain defense-related
questions in one class trial." Despite challenges that more effective mechanisms were available,"' the court maintained that the existence of such alternative methods did not automatically defeat superiority."
The Jenkins court determined that the large volume of litigation and the
greater frequency of mass disasters were leading the courts in a new direction.6 7 Although the use of class actions in the mass tort setting had usually
been avoided by courts in the past, the Jenkins court resolved to abandon the
repetitive hearings with the same witnesses, arguments, exhibits, and issues, and
litigate the entire controversy at once.' s
According to the Jenkins court, the class action method would save both
litigant and judicial resources. 9 The court's examination of the common issues,
such as the defense-relatedquestions ofproduct identification, product defectiveness, gross negligence, and punitive damages would presumably shorten the
individual trials. This technique would lower the defendants' attorneys' fees and
reduce the court's expenses. 70 Moreover, the court assumed that the plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees would be conservatively controlled by the judge. 71 The ultimate
result was an indication that the court was embracing, or at least tolerating, the
class action method in the arena of complex mass torts.

62.

The danger of the "opt-out" procedure, which presumes individuals to be in the settlement,

unless they opt out of it, is especially high in this case because even slight exposure to asbestos can
lead to rnesothelioma, a fatal lung disease. Those contracting the disease in the future may have little

or no memory of being exposed to asbestos. Therefore, the Georgine court found it unrealistic that
every individual could I) learn about the class action; 2) realize he was exposed to asbestos and
might one day contract a deadly disease; and 3) make a reasoned decision about whether to stay in
the class action. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 633.
63. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986), reh g and reh 'g en banc denied, (5th Cir. 1.986).
64. Id. at 473. In Jenkins, the common issues would be heard by a class jury, and the
individual issues concerning the unnamed members would be litigated in a number of "mini-trials"
of eight to ten plaintiffs. Id.
65. Id. For example, the class action opponents argued that the better alternative was resolution
of claims by a particular center created by the asbestos manufacturers. They also suggested using
"reverse bifurcation." Under this plan, each plaintiff would be allowed to attempt to prove asbestos
exposure and damage causation in one trial, and if successful, have his case settled or otherwise

resolved in a subesequent tial.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.

68.

Id.
Id.

69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN CASTANO
With this jurisprudential background, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

confronted the Castano Frankenstein's monster. The question was whether the
court would apply its own "class action friendly" analysis from Jenkins, or
whether it would adopt the recent hostility toward class actions as did its brother
circuit in Georgine. Unfortunately for the class proponents, the Fifth Circuit

opted for the latter.
In Castano, the court decertified the class for a number of reasons
within the context of Rule 23. More specifically, the court found fault with the
district court's analysis of the commonality/predominance and superiority
requriements.
A. Variations in State Law
The commonality/predominance requirement was unsatisfied, because the
district court had neglected to analyze how differences in eachjurisdiction's laws
would affect the various litigants.72 Had the district court conducted such an
analysis, it would have found that the variations in state law would create mass

confusion.
The Castanoplaintiff class was to consist of members from all fifty states
and other United States territories.73 Therefore, the debate centered around
whether each member's causes of action would be so generic that the common
issues would predominate over them, or whether the differences engendered by
such state-to-state variations would be unmanageable. 4
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that in order to certify a class in
a multiple jurisdiction action, a court must make the conflicts-of-law determinations before analyzing the commonality/predominance requirements, regardless

of the difficulty of such a task." It also noted that the burden of proof is on
the class action proponents, not on the challenger.7 6

72. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741, 744 (5th Cir. 1996).
73. Id. at 737.
74. Id. at 739. Although it conceded that manageability of the individual issues might prove
to be difficult,the district court concluded that such difficulties would "pale in comparison" to those
caused by thousands of similar trials throughout the country. Id. at 740.
75. Id. at 741. The district court had wrongly reasoned that the jurisprudence shows issues of
fraud, breach of warranty, negligence, intentional tort and strict liability do not vary so much from
state-to-state as to prevent common issues from predominating. It added that the defendants made
no showing to the contrary, either for the aforementioned issues, or for the issue of variations in the
consumer protection statutes. It also deemed it impossible to decide the commonality and
predominance questions because it had not yet made a conflict-of-laws determination. Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 554-55 (E.D. La. 1995).
76. Id. The district court had wrongly placed the burden on the challenger to show that
predominance will be defeated by such variations. Nevertheless, the instant defendants had provided
an extensive analysis of the numerous variations in state laws on a number of issues bound to arise
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After Castano, it is clear that School Asbestos does not stand for the
proposition that state laws do not vary on issues of negligence, strict liability, or
fraud; rather, it demonstrates to what lengths class action proponents in a
multiple jurisdiction case must go to have the class certified." Proponents are
required to extensively analyze state law variations and subsequently make
a
78
showing which overcomes the presumption of the class action's inferiority.

Finally, a district court must determine whether the class action will be
manageable in light of such state law variations. 7'9 The district court had
concluded, as in Jenkins,that a class jury's findings on the common issues would

significantly advance the resolution ofthousands, if not millions, of similar issues
in pending individual cases.8 0 However, the court found that the sheer
magnitude of Castano's class significantly distinguished it from the class in
Jenkins.s"

In addition, the court criticized the district court for failing to analyze the
manageability problem on a case-specific basis. 2 Rather than simply analogizing the case to a previous one, the court stated that Rule 23(b)(3)(D) requires a
court to make a fact-specific finding of manageability. s3
B. Considerationof the Alternative
A district court must consider how the trials of the individual plaintiffs

would otherwise be litigated, so that it can know which issues will be most
significantly contested, and therefore common and predominating. 4 A mere
conclusion that common issues will play a part in every trial, and therefore, such
common issues are significant and predominating, is inadequate.' s

in litigation of the suit. However, in ruling for the class action proponents, the district court relied
on nothing more than two state law surveys: the School Asbestos decision and a similar district court
opinion. Id. at 742-43.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 743.
80. Id. at 744.
81. Id. While the Jenkins plaintiffs alleged one ordinary cause of action, the instant case's
plaintiffs alleged eight novel causes of action. Although Jenkins involved the law of only one state,
the instant case faced the problem of distinguishing the laws of all the states. Finally, Jenkins
involved only 893 plaintiffs, but the number of plaintiffs in the instant case was expected' to reach
the millions. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 744-45.
85. Id. at 745. The district court had determined that, like in Jenkins, class treatment of
common issues would "significantly advance" individual trials. Id. at 744. In Jenkins, however, the
district judge was quite experienced in dealing with similar asbestos cases and knew exattly how
such individual trials would be conducted. On the other hand, Castano'sdistrictjudge was struggling
with a unique case consisting of several novel causes of action. In Jenkins, the district court certified
a particular defense issue for class litigation because it had proven to be the most significant
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The court stated that blind acceptance of the predominance of the common
issues can also affect the superiority analysis." The complex mass tort, which
involves individuals claiming various degrees of injuries over a period of time,
has much more difficulty satisfying the superiority requirment than the single
disaster mass tort, because of the greater number of individual issues in the
former.8 7
C. Consideration of the Disadvantages in Litigating a Class Action Suit
A district court's failure to consider the disadvantages in litigating such a
class action can produce a faulty superiority analysis.8" For the following
reasons, the Castanocourt concluded that the district court abused its discretion
in determining that a class action was the superior method of adjudication.
First, the district court failed to consider the class action's inherent
unfairness to defendants.8 9 Class certification of mass torts magnifies the
potential amount of damages, because it allows both legitimate and illegitimate
plaintiffs to initially join the class.9 ° This inflated number of plaintiffs places
incredible pressure on the defendants to settle, even if there is a high probability
of their being successful at trial."
Second, the district court failed to properly analyze the problems of the
class' manageability. 2 These problems include variations in state law, the
existence of several uncommon issues (discussed earlier), 3 the difficulty of
giving proper notice to the millions of potential plaintiffs, and the difficulty of
determining which plaintiffs were actually nicotine-dependent."'
Third, while the district court speculated that the class action would prevent
millions of expensive individual trials, the court did not point to any hard
evidence that a judicial crisis was pending. 9 The court determined that
superiority was lacking without proof of a management crisis."

contested issue in similar cases. However, the Castano district court had no judicial track record.
Id. at 745 n.18.
86. Id. at 745 n.19.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 746.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.. 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987)).
91. Id. (citing Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80
Cornell L. Rev. 941, 958 (1995)). This incredible pressure results in what the court calls "judicial
blackmail." Id.
92. Id. at 747.
93. See supra Section IV. Part A. Variations in State Law.
94. Castano, 84 F.3d at 747.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 748 (citing In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996)). The
court contended that only 10% to 20% ofpotential plaintiffs actually file tort suits against the alleged
wrongdoers. Id. at 748 n.26 (citing Francis E. McGovern, Anaysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73
Tex. L. Rev. 1821, 1834-35 (1995)). Reasons for not filing suit include fear or disdain of litigation,
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Fourth, the district court should have determined whether it was dealing with
a negative-value suit.97 The court stated that the class action is most justified
in the context of a negative-value suit, in which plaintiffs are discouraged from
bringing suit because the expense of litigating the individual trials would
outweigh the potential gains.98 However, the plaintiffs in the instant case faced
the prospect of receiving large damage awards, which could easily pay the costs
of litigation." In addition, many states have attorneys' fees provisions built
into their consumer protection statutes to prevent such negative-value problems."° The court concluded that without such negative-value prospects, the
court should avoid allowing a single panel of jurors to determine the fate of an
entire American industry.' 0

Finally, the court was skeptical as to whether the district court's pronouncement that class certification would preserve vital judicial resources was

"
correct.'02
Certain common issues, such as comparative negligence and
reliance, because oftheir individual nature, might require subsequent adjudication

at the individual level. 0 3 This re-litigation would require the same repetition
of evidence and wasting of judicial resources which the class certification was
designed to avoid.'
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CASTANO OPINION

In Castano, a discerning appellate court prevented a judicial disaster by
keeping a well-intentioned, but short-sighted district court in check. The court
correctly concluded that immature, complex mass torts should not be litigated as
class actions. The case demonstrates that the commonality/predominance and
superiority requirements can be effective tools in defeating such Frankenstein's
monsters.
A. Complex Mass Torts
Castanoindicates that, when determining certificationof complexmass torts,
courts should strictly apply the commonality/predominance and superiority
requirements. A simple mass tort, such as an airplane crash, is not ordinarily

privacy concerns, high degrees of comparative negligence, and access to medical alternatives, such
as Medicaid. Id. (citing McGovern, supra, at 1827-28).
97. Id. at 748.
98. Id.
99. Id. Depending on the choice-of-law determinations, some plaintiffs could receive both
compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,1300(7th Cir.), cerH. denied, 116
S. Ct. 184, 133 (1995)).
102. Id. at 749.
103. Id.

104.

Id.
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appropriate for class action determination because of the likely presence of
significant individual questions of liability, damages, and defenses.'
However, courts have justified class certification of these torts, presumably, because at
least the cause of the accident is the same for each plaintiff.' 06
In a complex mass tort suit, however, such as a nationwide products liability
action, there is no one accident causing the damage.'0 7 As a result, there is no
one set of facts establishing liability, no one set of laws, and there is the
potential for numerous affirmative defenses.'" For these reasons, the complex
mass tort class action should be certified, if at all, in very limited situations, such
as when there is little state law variation and the plaintiffs face negative-value
prospects.
B. Unfairness to Defendants
The Castano opinion openly criticizes the class action's inherent unfairness

toward defendants. 9 The court has made an about face from its Jenkins
decision, in which it determined that "[class action] defendants enjoy all of the
advantages, and the plaintiffs incur all the disadvantages."" The analysis in
Castano is more accurate, because it factors in more than just the amount of
judicial resources and attorneys' fees. The inflated number of litigants, combined
with the prospects of an "all-or-nothing" proposition submitted to a single jury,
dramatically raises the financial stakes and places on the defendants an incredible
amount of pressure to settle."' The Castano court correctly concluded that
defendants need not be subjected to such unfairness when there are feasible
alternatives.
C Individual Adjudication for Non-Negative Value Suits
In Castano, one feasible alternative was the most obvious: each plaintiff
could litigatd his own case. This traditional method of adjudication was proper
under the circumstances, because the plaintiffs were not faced with the prospect
of negative-value suits. The primary justification for the class action is to
provide legal recourse for those who would not otherwise be financially inclined

105.

Id. at 745 n.19 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Advisory Committee's Notes to 1966

Amendment).
106. Id. at 747 n.23 (citing Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir.
1988)).
107.

Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 628 (3d Cir. 1996).

108.

Id.

109. Castano, 84 F.3d at 746.
110. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986), reh g and reh 'g en banc
denied, (5th Cir. 1986). The Jenkins court found that common issues won by the defendants would
mean elimination of such at the individual trials, saving trial time and attorneys' fees. Id.
S11. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
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to pursue it." 2 However, when the plaintiffs have the potential for large gains,
the class action method is simply not required, and is certainly not the superior
method of adjudication.
The Castano opinion stops short of banning all non-negative value suits from
being litigated as class actions. However, it appears that proponents of such suits
may have difficulty maneuvering around the superiority requirement in the
future.
D. Immature, Complex Mass Torts
After Castano, the question remains whether an immature, complex mass tort
will ever meet the requirements of Rule 23. The Castano opinion implies that
class litigation of an immature tort is like drinking a young bottle of wine:
better results are achieved by waiting for the aging process to take its course.
The immature nature of a tort can lead a district court to certify a class
prematurely, because it is impossible to properly address the commonali13
ty/predominance and superiority requirements in the tort's early stages."
Proper application of the commonality/predominance test is impossible, because
determination of whether certain common issues would be significant parts of the
individual trials is impossible without a judicial track record on which to
rely." 4 In addition, the immature nature of the tort prevents an adequate
superiority analysis, because it is impossible to determine whether the judicial
situation will be manageable at the individual level or whether such suits will
create a judicial crisis." 5 Also, class litigation may not be superior, because
certification of an immature tort brings unique and unforeseen problems which

may consume more judicial resources than those saved by class certification."'
The court correctly concluded that a more favorable plan of action in
confronting immature, complex mass torts is to deny class certification at first,
providing only a window for individual state court adjudication of claims.117
Such a window allows both the parties and the courts an opportunity to gain

experience with the novel causes of action."' After the tort is given a chance
to mature, a district court can properly reconsider whether common issues

actually predominate, whether the class action method is actually superior, and
ultimately, whether the case should be litigated as a class action.

112.
113.
114.

Id. at 748.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 745.

115.

Id.at 747.

116.
117.

Id. at 749.
Id.
118. Id. at 750. During this window, state courts can address and properly apply its own law
to the novel theories, aggressively weed out untenable theories, and use management techniques to
avoid discovery abuses. Meanwhile, the parties can experiment with mediation or arbitration. Id.
at 747 n.24 (citing Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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E. Choice-of-Law Problems
Complicated nationwide products liability cases like Castano renew the call
for federal choice-of-law rules. In Castano, the commonality/predominance
requirement was unsatisfied, because the district court had neglected to make the
difficult choice-of-law determinations and, therefore, did not know which law
would apply." 9 The district court's oversight was reasonable, considering the
magnitude of such a task. 20 Class certification of such complex nationwide
cases may be impossible without a uniform set of choice-of-law rules. Several
commentators, as well as the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation
Project, have called for the creation of federal common law choice-of-law rules
to be used in these situations. " - However, neither the federal courts nor
Congress have adopted such a proposal.' 2
F. Substantive Federal Common Law
Other commentators have called for the creation of a substantive federal
common law in the context of complex mass torts. 23 Such a creation would
certainly make the district court's commonality/predominance inquiry much
easier, because it would no longer need to consider the numerous variations in
state law.
However, the Castano court's refusal to adopt such an approach must be
seen as a deliberate refusal to devise such a nationwide scheme. This position
has been taken by federal courts in the past, especially when Congress has failed
to enact a federal legislative policy on the subject.' 24 Previous reasons for such
a refusal include the practical problems inherent in displacing state law and the
absence of a unique federal interest.'
The Castano court's refusal to fashion a federal common law on nicotine
addictivity was in line with these prior decisions. The adoption of a federal
common law in this context would open the floodgates to litigation of hundreds
of other so-called "national" problems. However, the federal courts will simply

119. Id. at 741.
120. Id. at 741 (citing Georgine, 83 F.3d at 618). Both courts decertified the classes because
"legal and factual differences in the plaintiffs' claims, when exponentially magnified by choice of

law considerations, eclipsed any common issues ....
121.

1996).
122.

."

Id.

Richard H.Fallon, Jr. et al., The Federal Courts and The Federal System 805 (4th ed.

Id.

123. Fallon et al., supra note 121, at 805 (citing Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the
Mass-Tort Case: A ProposedFederalProcedureAct, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1039, 1077-79 (1986)).
124. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980) (refusing to enact
federal common law for veterans' personal injuries against herbicide suppliers) and Jackson v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (refusing to develop common law for asbestosrelated injuries).
125. Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1327.
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not allow, nor should they allow, the federal courthouse to become the place to
solve all of the nation's problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
America has gone class action crazy. The Georgineand Castanocases alone
could have included millions of American citizens. Recently, lawyers for crack
cocaine addicts,'2 6 Hooters restaurant waitresses, 1 " marijuana-prescribing
doctors,"' and America Online intemet users' 2' have filed or have threatened
to file separate class action lawsuits.
Undoubtedly, some of these suits will involve novel causes of action. Such
immature torts should not be litigated in the class action context, especially those
which involve significant variations in state law or which would result in nonnegative value suits. Courts facing the class certification of immature, complex
mass torts should follow the leads of Castano and Georgine and apply strict
commonality/predominance and superiority analyses. A court should force
plaintiffs to individually litigate immature torts until the court, after-extensive
analysis of how these torts are litigated, is confident that the requirements of
Rule 23 will be met.
Michael H. Pinkerton
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